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THE CONTROLLABILITY OF A MONETARY AGGREGATE IN EMU 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The ECB has still not decided which monetary policy strategy to pursue 
from 1999. However, the preparatory work has reduced the possible alternatives 
to two: a strategy of intermediate objectives fixed in terms of the quantity of 
money and a direct inflation targeting strategy. It would be also possible to apply 
a strategy combining elements of both. 
In accordance with the basic documents drawn up by the EM! to analyze 
the single monetary policy, the effectiveness of a strategy based on an 
intermediate target depends greatly, first, on whether there is a stable (or at 
least predictable) relationship between the chosen monetary aggregate and the 
final objective; and second, "on whether the targeted monetary aggregate is 
controllable by the central bank through the use of monetary policy 
instruments"( 1). 
Most of the studies conducted on these matters in the EMI have focused 
on examining the stability of a monetary aggregate at the European level(2), On 
the contrary, the question of the controllability of the intermediate objective by 
means of monetary policy instruments has received less attention(3J. 
Evidently, however, if finally a strategy is chosen where a monetary 
aggregate is set as the intermediate objective, it is necessary that the ECB should 
have the capacity to influence the money stock. Faced with deviations by the 
demand for money in respect of the target set, the ECB shall assess the possible 
causes behind such differences and decide whether they can be accommodated or, 
(!) See European Monetary Institute 1993 and 1997. 
(2) See, in this respect, Fagan and Henry, 1996, 1997a and 1997b. 
(3) Other studies addressing the issue of the controllability of a monetary 
aggregate in Stage Three are Browne, Fagan and Henry (1996) and more recently 
Viaar and Schubert (1998). These papers yield contrasting results regarding this 
issue. 
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on the contrary, whether they should be corrected. In this second case, the use 
of monetary policy instruments should allow the deviations recorded to be 
reduced in a relatively short period. In this sense, controllability requires that the 
ECB should be able effectively to influence the monetary aggregate in the short 
term. It does not suffice, therefore, for the ECB to have means for steering the 
money stock in the medium and long term; control must be exerted in a relatively 
immediate fashion. 
The absence of appropriate controllability of the intermediate objective by 
the ECB would detract from the consideration of a monetary aggregate as an 
objective of monetary policy. Also, monetary management would become more 
confused, as agents would not know whether the deviations between the actual 
course of the monetary aggregate and its target path were the result of an 
accommodating policy by the ECB or of the impossibility of controlling the 
aggregate in the short term. Finally, this would all harm the credibility of the 
ECB and of the common monetary policy, because the formally announced 
objectives could fail to be met without the ECB being able to do anything to avoid 
it<4) . 
This paper analyses the possibilities for the ECB effectively to control the 
course of a monetary aggregate representative of liquidity in EMU. Such 
controllability is especially necessary if the ECB decides to apply a strategy 
monitoring an objective in terms of a monetary aggregate. Section 2 revises the 
mechanisms through which monetary policy can control the money stock. Section 
3 examines the empirical properties of the demand f9r money in EMU and in a 
country, such as Germany, which continues to set objectives in terms of a 
monetary aggregate. Section 4 shows the differential effects arising from 
implementing a common monetary policy in EMU11 compared with those that 
would ensue were there a degree of control of the monetary magnitudes such as 
that in Germany. The conclusions of the paper are drawn in section 5. At the end 
of the document, two annexes are presented explaining some of the 
methodological. technical and econometric aspects used in the paper. 
(4) In this sense, the ECB's evident lack of a track record implies that agents 
might not be as benign as they are towards other NCBs that have pursued 
successful anti-inflationary policies if, early into EMU, the monetary objectives 
set are not met. 
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2. CONTROLLABILITY IN THE OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL 
FRAMEWORK OF EMU 
The controllability of an intermediate monetary objective consists of the 
capacity that a central bank has to influence its course. A variable would be 
controllable if the central bank could know with reasonable certainty how to use 
the instruments within its reach to achieve a change in such a variable in the 
direction and of the intensity desired. 
The instruments available to the central bank are closely linked to the 
design of the monetary policy operational framework. Under arrangements such 
as those for EMU, where the common monetary policy operational objective is a 
very short-term interest rate, modifying short-term financial conditions will be 
the main instrument the ECB could use to control the money stoCk(Sl. Hence the 
influence monetary policy exerts on the demand for money will he channelled 
through the transmission from short-term interest rates in the money markets 
to the interest rates on financial instruments with other terms and in other 
markets. This transmission will alter the remuneration on the financial 
instruments included in the definition of the targeted monetary aggregate and 
that on those not included therein. Insofar as liquid assets are not remunerated 
or are less sensitive than other assets to changes in money market interest rates, 
the effect of monetary policy measures will induce shifts in liquid assets toward 
other assets, thereby contracting the demand for money. 
Evidently, there are other mechanisms through which changes in short­
term interest rates can influence in the money stock. Thus, changes in interest 
rates affect agents' incentives to save and to spend, the demand for credit and, 
in sum, nominal expenditure in the economy, whereby they also change the 
demand for liquid assets to finance transactions. Changes in interest rates can 
also generate income and wealth effects which ultimately result in changes in the 
demand for money. 
(0) Under a traditional monetary policy framework, based on the control of the 
supply of bank reserves, the central bank would analyze how the monetary 
multiplier influences changes in the money stock. 
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However, this second channel is much slower than the first one, since its 
effects are more indirect and also more complex. Accordingly. it is very difficult 
to analyze it empirically'''. Contrary to the monetary policy effect on the 
demand for financial assets, which can be relatively quick, the magnitude and the 
speed of adjustment with which changes in short-term interest rates affect 
expenditure in the economy will depend on the characteristics of their financial 
structure (volume and term of credit granted to households and firms, 
adaptability of interest rates, indebtedness of non-financial sectors, volume and 
financing of the public deficit) and on price and wage-setting mechanisms. In 
short, there is a combination of structural and institutional factors of the 
economy which. as different studies show. mean that the transmission of 
monetary policy impulses to the final variables of the economy differs as much 
in speed as in power(7). 
Compared with this combined analysis of the different links between 
interest rates and money, this paper will focus on analysing the controllability 
of the money stock in terms of a demand equation. Here the main channel of 
transmission of interest rates to the monetary aggregate is well defined and 
controllability is clearer, in the sense that the central bank can know with 
reasonable certainty what the impact of its decisions will be on the money stock 
in the short tenn(8). Therefore, an examination is made of the capacity the ECB 
will have to control a monetary aggregate in terms of how monetary policy will 
affect the interest rates on liquid and illiquid assetsl9J• 
(6) An attempt to perform a general analysis of the transmission mechanism 
between interest rates and the money stock is made in Browne, Fagan and Henry 
(1996) and Viaar and Schubert (1998) via a V AR methodology. 
(71 See Gerlach and Smets (1994 and 1995) and Kennedy (1996). 
181 Admittedly. this type of analysis has also become more complex as a result 
of intense liberalisation and financial innovation in recent years. The return 
offered on certain liquid assets has increased and, on occasions, said return is 
linked to the course of money market interest rates. In terms of the analysis of 
the demand for money, this new financial context means that the transmission 
of interest rates to money demand may manifest some perverse effect, boosting 
the demand for money in the face of monetary policy tightening. 
(9) The analysis to be carried out will, it is true, be a partial eqUilibrium 
analysis in which the medium-term interaction between interest rates and 
nominal expenditure will not be taken into account. However, since controllability 
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The capacity of a central bank to control a specific monetary aggregate 
may be limited by other factors mentioned below, but which are not the subject 
of this paper. Firstly, it seems that the basis underpinning the choice of a target 
monetary aggregate is, essentially, that it should show an appropriate degree of 
stability in relation to final variables, such as nominal expenditure. However, 
that stability relationship may require the target aggregate to be relatively broad 
and to include assets that are not fully liquid or are remunerated at market 
rates. In this sense, as mentioned in the MPSC document cited in the 
introduction, it may well be that the "closer the link between the final target and 
the intermediate variable, the less that variable may turn out to be controllable 
by monetary instruments." Secondly, controllability is affected by Goodhart's law 
according to which lias soon as the authorities try to exploit an economic 
relationship to achieve their objectives, agents tend to modify their behaviour so 
as to circumvent the implications of the authorities' actions, thereby undermining 
the stability of the relationship." 
At a time when the monetary policy strategy to be applied by the ECB 
from 1999 is under discussion, it is highly relevant to analyze in detail the extent 
to which a targeted monetary aggregate may be effectively controlled by the ECB. 
To do this, an analysis follows of the properties of the money demand equations 
that may be considered for the group of countries that will form EMU. 
3. SPECIFICATION OF THE DEMAND FOR MONEY: COMPARISON 
OF THE RESULTS FOR THE EMU AREA AND GERMANY 
This paper sets out to analyze the controllability of the money stock, 
examining how the central bank can directly affect the demand for money by 
means of the use of short-tenn interest rates as instruments. In fact, among the 
traditional detenninants of the demand for money are, besides prices and 
nominal income, the level of interest rates, either. broadly speaking or 
distinguishing between short-term and long-term rates. Specifically, a money 
demand equation for EMUll and for Germany will be specified, with the aim of 
requires that monetary policy should influence money in the short term and, 
where appropriate, correct deviations by the monetary aggregate from its target 
path, this shortcoming may not be so relevant. 
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analysing the possible differences between the degree of controUability in the 
respective areas. The reason for using Gennany as a reference in this analysis 
lies in the fact that the Bundesbank is one of the few central banks that 
continues to pursue a monetary policy framework based on an intermediate 
monetary target, and in that the relationship between the demand for money and 
the final targets in Germany is the one that has been cited to defend a similar 
framework in EMUll. 
As discussed in the previous section, there is broad consensus that a 
central bank can only make a monetary aggregate an intermediate target of 
monetary policy if it shows sufficient stability and controUability. The stability 
of the relationship between the monetary aggregate and nominal expenditure is 
necessary so that the central bank may be convinced that the course of money is 
actually anticipating what the cyclical situation of the economy so that the 
monitoring and control of the money stock is a sound mechanism for stabilising 
economic activity. The positive results obtained in former analyses of the stability 
of the money demand equation have served to advocate a strategy ofintermediate 
targets in EMUll. 
In EMUll. the analyses performed point to the fact that the demand for 
money remains significantly stable in its relationship to nominal expenditure. A 
simple graphical analysis may illustrate this result, In Chart 1, developments are 
presented in terms of the annual growth of nominal expenditure and money, 
represented by the definition of a broad aggregate (M3) both for Germany and for 
EMU11 as a whole. Over an extensive time perspective, the relatively close 
course foUowed by the monetary variables and nominal output over the past 
thirty years is apparent. The course of these two variables is particularly striking 
in the case of EMUll. The relationship shown by the charts is confirmed by 
means of statistical tests both for EMUll and for Germany that highlight the 
existence of a cointegration relationship between both variables and unit 
elasticity between nominal income and the money stock (see annex 1). 
Yet a differentiating aspect between both areas is how interest rates affect 
the demand for money in each case. Chart 2 plots long-term interest rates along 
with the annual growth of the velocity of circulation for Germany and for EMUll. 
It can be seen that the path of long-term rates is very similar in both areas. 
However, it seems that interest-rate upward or downward movements are 
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Chart 2 
• 
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associated with wider-ranging movements in the velocity of circulation in 
Germany than in EMUll, i.e. with more abrupt changes and of the opposite sign 
in the demand for money. 
The reason for this might be that in Germany there is a wide spread 
between interest rates on liquid assets (very low or zero) and those on non­
monetary assets. In this respect, the potential perverse effect arising because 
greater monetary tightness may encourage the demand for remunerated liquid 
assets is not very significant in the German case. On the contrary, in most of the 
other EU countries, financial innovation in the late seventies prompted 
considerable changes in their financial systems that affected most particularly 
the traditional considerations of profitability, risk and liquidity that marked the 
dividing line between monetary and other assets. In these countries, a significant 
portion of liquid assets has a remuneration linked to that of short-term interest 
rates, which tends to generate a short-term perverse effect on the demand for 
money following a change in the monetary policy stance. 
One may argue that the existence of not fully remunerated minimum 
reserves in Germany during most of the period analyzed might explain the higher 
sensitivity of money demand in Germany to changes in interest rates. In this 
respect, it should be highlighted that, whereas the difference between the own 
return on the broad money stock and money market rates (the so-called "wedge") 
actually has a significant impact on the growth of the money stock, it is observed 
that the tax imposed by the reserve requirement system exerts little influence on 
the pattern of the wedge itself. Even non-remunerated minimum reserves of a 
certain magnitude only affect the growth of money demand very modestly. 
Moreover, some of the countries in EMUll, such as Italy or Spain, have actually 
implemented during the last two decades minimum reserve systems more 
exacting for credit institutions than the one established in Germany. Therefore, 
it seems that other features of the structure of the financial system are more 
likely to be at the core of the different relationship between money and interest 
rates in Germany and EMUll. 
3.1 Specification of the money demand equations 
After testing that a cointegration relationship and unit elasticity between 
M3 and nominal GDP holds, annex 1 es�mates several specifications of money 
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demand equations expressed in terms of the inverse of the velocity of circulation, 
where the alternative interest rate is included as an endogenous variable in the 
detennination of the long-term relationship'lO"". In this regard, the 
specification showing the best statistical properties is that only including the 
long-term interest rate. However, the latter, in turn, is a function of the short­
term rate<t2). Consequently, the effect of the long-term rate on the money 
demand equation is implicitly including the effect of the short-term rate, which 
is that on which the monetary authority directly acts. 
The results of the estimates of the demand equations highlight that both 
areas show very similar behaviour in the long run as regards their relationship 
to nominal expenditure. However, the differentiating effect between both 
equations is determined by the sensitivity of the velocity of circulation to 
interest rates. In connection with this latter point, it is estimated that the semi­
elasticity of M3 to the long-term interest rate for Germany is 5.3 compared with 
the estimated elasticity for EMUll of 0.9. That is to say, the response of the 
interest rate to the demand for money is, in Germany, around five times higher 
than in EMUll. This ratifies the observations put forward in the light of Chart 
2. 
In relation to the dynamics of the adjustment process, Chart 3a depicts the 
accumulated response function of the money stock to changes in interest rates, 
in terms of semi-elasticities, obtained directly from the estimation of the velocity 
equation. In EMUll, the dominant effect in the whole adjustment process is 
basically contemporaneous while, in Germany the overall impact of interest rates 
on M3 tends to distribute over time. The difference between both response 
no) A more complex specification including the own return on liquid assets, 
together with the long-term interest rate, has not been considered due to the lack 
of reliable information. 
(11) The sample period spans the period from 1970 to 1997 with annual 
frequency. 
(12) The reason for this choice is justified in annex 1, while annex 2 estimates 
an interest-rate equation in which the structure of the pass-through from the 
short- to the long-term rate prevailing in both areas is determined. These results 
are later used to estimate the dynamics of the response of the short-term rate to 
the demand for money and in the controllability simulation exercise proposed in 
paragraph 4. 
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functions shows that, in the short run, the elasticity of the long-term interest rate 
in Germany is twice that in EMUll, while in the long run, the effect is 
ultimately five times greater. 
However, the relevant aspect worth analysing is the dynamic adjustment 
of the money stock in the face of a change in the monetary policy stance, 
approximated by a change in short-term interest rates. To do this, the term 
structure equation estimated for each area (presented in annex 2) is combined 
with the velocity-of-circulation equation estimated with long-term rates as 
alternative return Chart 3b draws together the dynamics of this adjustment from 
short-term rates to the demand for money. It is first observed that in Germany 
as in EMUll, the effect of the short-term rate accounts for around 70% and 60%, 
respectively, of the total effect -represented by the effect of the long-term rate­
that interest rates have on the money stock. Significantly. the contemporaneous 
effect of the short-term rate is very similar in Germany and in EMU11. the 
differences becoming greater from the second year onwards. In any event, the 
dynamics and the final effect of the short-term rate are very similar to that 
shown in the adjustment of the long-term rate and the differences between both 
areas maintain the same relationship as observed in Chart 3a. 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONTROLLABILITY OF A MONETARY 
AGGREGATE IN THE EMU AREA 
To illustrate the effect that the different sensitivity of interest rates to the 
demand for money may have for controllability induced by a central bank, this 
section proposes a simplified exercise. It assesses the effectiveness of a change 
monetary policy stance within a traditional intermediate-target framework and 
in two different environments: the one underlying the German M3 demand 
equation and the corresponding one of the EMU11 equation, The exercise seeks 
to address the importance for a central bank of being able to anticipate with as 
much certainty as possible the scope and duration of the first and most direct 
effect of a movement in interest rates on the stock of money in circulation, with 
a view to assessing the advisability or not of correcting deviations from planned 
paths of monetary growth. 
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Two kinds of exercise are performed, on the basis of the estimated velocity 
and interest-rate equations. The first compares the monetary expansion paths for 
the two areas, Germany and EMUll, implementing a common interest rate 
scenario. The second attempts to assess the speed of return and change in 
interest rates there must be to resume a planned path of monetary expansion in 
the medium term, in the presence of a positive liquidity shock. Both simulations 
are post .. sample, on a period running from 1999 until the year 2008. 
The main results of the exercise can be summarised as follows: 
• As expected, the projected monetary expansion path, given a common 
interest-rate scenario, shows a greater range of movements in Germany 
than in EMUll, with a gap of over one point opening up between both 
paths in terms of annual growth during the simulation period. 
• In the face of a monetary shock of the same magnitude in both areas and 
implementing identical monetary policy tightness, the projected monetary 
growth path would resume in two years in Germany. In the case of 
EMU11 it would be necessary to prolong a restrictive rates path up to four 
years to recover the projected level. 
• In terms of magnitude, if in EMU11 it were wished to return to the 
projected monetary growth path in the some time span as in Germany 
(two years), it would be necessary to double the degree of tightness of 
monetary policy. 
4.1 Establishing the interest rate path 
Prior to determining these simulation exercises, it is needed to establish 
the interest-rate scenario most attuned to the economic cycle. This means 
establishing a short-term interest-rate scenario that passes its structure through 
to long-term rates. The projection of this short- and long-term rate path running 
from 1999 to the year 2008 is common to the two areas, and is underpinned by 
the convergence in interest rates in the euro area that will take place at the end 
of 1998. 
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In this respect, Chart 4a shows short-term interest rates in Germany from 
1968 to 1997. A fairly regular cyclical pattern is observed; the average length of 
a complete interest-rate cycle in Germany is around 10 years. The width of the 
cycles oscillates between 6 and 8 points. In the light of the chart, it can be 
assumed that between 1997 and 1998 the latest cycle of short-term interest rates 
concludes and that, starting from 1998, a new cycle begins, extending over ten 
years. This extrapolation of the short-term interest-rate cycle is also applied to 
the EMUll area. 
Specifically, for 1998, considering an economic scenario with real GDP 
growth of 2.5%, price growth of 1.5% and monetary growth of 4%, short-term 
interest rates stand at 3.3%. As from this year, a period of rising interest rates 
begins that runs for 4 years, with rises of the order of 1.5 points per year, until 
peaking (9.3%) in the year 2002. Thereafter, there is a progressive reduction, of 
1 point per year, until resuming a level of 3.3% in the year 2008 (once again, see 
Chart 4a)"3). 
To obtain the long-term path of interest rates derived from the cycle of 
short-term rates, two alternative methodologies (discussed in detail in annex 2) 
are considered. First, there is the estimation, as mentioned previously, of a tenn­
structure equation establishing the link between the short- and long-term rate 
(the "backward looking" method)"". This method places most emphasis on the 
historical course of long- and short-term interest rates. The alternative is a 
"forward-lookingll method, which makes long-term rates dependent on expected 
,,3) The interest-rate cycle estimated for the initial years of EMU might seem 
to be too ample if non-inflationary growth persist and the Stability Pact actually 
contributes to a more balanced policy-mix. However, it is very difficult to envisage 
a scenario of ECB's interest rates other than that reflecting the past Bundesbank 
behaviour. 
(1') Estimated equations of term-structure of interest rates for both, Germany 
and EMU11, can be found in the mentioned annex 2. As it is apparent from chart 
4, the pattern of EMUll interest-rates tends to converge over time towarde the 
German one. This fact, together with the expectation that the behaviour of long­
term interest-rates in EMU will be closer to the German pattern, rather than to 
the historical behaviour of EMU11 interest-rates, justify the choice of estimates 
for Germany to extrapolate the EMUll path of interest-rates after 1999 based 
on a "backward-looking method". 
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future short-term rates. The shaded area of Charts 4a and 4b shows the projected 
paths of rates for the simulation period in question. 
4.2 Comparison of the paths of monetary growth between Germany 
and EMUll 
Starting from the estimated velocity equation for both areas and from the 
long-term rate scenario, path of M3 monetary growth is projected for the period 
1999·2008. The results of this projection are drawn together in Charts 5a and 5b. 
In the first chart, the path is depicted using the "backward-looking" method of 
long-term interest-rate extrapolation. It can be seen how the estimated path for 
EMUl1 is less sensitive to changes in interest rates, both in the period of 
restriction of monetary growth running to the year 2002 and in that of relaxation 
of monetary policy. Note that a continuous period of rising short-term rates, for 
a total of 6 points, translates only into a decrease in the stock of money in 
circulation of 0.5 points. There is all the more a certain perverse effect in the first 
year following the monetary tightening. The response of the demand for liquidity 
in Germany to the same structure of rates is much more marked, decreasing the 
money stock by 1.5 points. Likewise, in Germany, the process of recovery of 
liquidity growth is longer and more intense when monetary easing is applied 
than in the case of EMUll, whose growth tends to stagnate relatively rapidly. 
Chart 5b shows similar results to Chart 5a, although the difference 
between both areas is more qualified as a result of extrapolating the cycle of long­
term rates stemming from the forward·looking methodology with a lesser width 
of its cycle and a lack of complete pass-through from the rising/declining cycle of 
short-term rates to long-term rates. This results in a lesser effect of interest rates 
on the velocity equations. The monetary expansion paths for both areas hold, in 
Germany, between 3.5% and 4.5% over the course of the complete cycle, and 
around 4% for EMUll. 
4.3 Effect of a liquidity shock on the foreseen monetary growth path. 
The second simulation exercise aims at assessing the differences in the 
response of monetary growth to interest rates given an undesired monetary 
surprise. An analysis has thus been made of what the intensity and the speed of 
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return to a path of sustained M3 growth of 4% would be if, at the beginning of 
the period of simulation, for example 1999, a positive monetary shock placed 
liquidity growth at 8%(15'. Further, the responses by the German and EMUll 
equations are compared when faced with an identical monetary policy restriction 
to resume the aforementioned sustained path of 4%"". Concretely, to counter 
the effect of the expansionary liquidity shock, a restrictive monetary policy is 
implemented. This involves increasing interest rates by 1.5 points per year from 
1999 until neutralising the unwanted effect. 
Chart 6 shows the various estimated paths of return. It can be seen how 
in Germany the application of interest rate rises offsets in two years the 
deviation of 4 points caused by the 1999 shock. However, in the case of EMUll, 
this restrictive monetary policy has to be prolonged until the year 2003, with a 
rise in short-term rates of 6 points having to be applied. If the monetary 
authority of EMU11 decided to neutralise this effect in two years, it would have 
to double the intensity of its restrictive monetary policy, applying an increase of 
3 points in each year (6 points in total), compared with the 1.5 point rise in each 
of the two years needed by the German monetary authority. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper shows that it is very likely that the controllability of the money 
stock in EMU be poorer than that prevailing in Germany, so that the ECB, if 
finally decides to pursue a monetary strategy based on an intermediate monetary 
aggregate, may face severe problems to counter liquidity shocks bringing money 
outside the targeted band. 
The type of partial-equilibrium quantitative exercise supporting this 
argument has shown, over an extensive sample period, that stability in the 
(15) As equations are defined in terms of velocity both for Germany and 
EMUll and dynamics do not differ significantly, hypothesis regarding nominal 
growth of GDP are not relevant for the outcome of this exercise. 
(16) The annual average monetary growth rate of 4% is considered compatible 
with the interest-rate scenario proposed in this paper, and with the scenario, 
common to both areas, of the nominal expenditure growth projected for 1998 and 
extrapolated for the whole of the simulation period: price growth of 1.5% and real 
GDP growth of 2.5%. 
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relationship between the money stock and the economy's final variables are a 
necessary but insufficient condition for ensuring the controllability of an 
aggregate. The composition of a monetary aggregate must be such that its return 
and liquidity conditions provide a rapid, intense channel of transmission from the 
monetary control instrument to the intermediate target. In this respect, it has 
been seen how, defining money demand for the EMUll area, the intensity and 
time of response to changes in interest rates are appreciably less and more 
extensive over time than those arising in the case of Germany I which has 
traditionally pursued an intermediate-target strategy. 
The German minimum reserve system does not seem to be at the basis of 
the different sensitivity of money to interest rate changes as compared to EMUll. 
It is the different structure of the German financial system as compared to that 
of other European countries what seems to be the best explanation for the 
stronger ability of the Bundesbank to exert a certain control on monetary targets. 
However, the ECB will have to cope with a financial structure which 
unfortunately will probably not allow it to control money demand with the same 
effectiveness. 
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Annex 1. Econometric specification and results on money demand 
This annex discusses econometric aspects of the money demand equations 
specified for Germany and for the EMUll group and presents the results of the 
estimates. 
a.1.1 Variables used in the analysis 
The source of statistical information used in the econometric exercise is 
the April 20 1998 edition of Statistical Annex of European Economy (SAEE). 
The frequency of the data used in the analysis is yearly. The definition of the 
variables is as follows. 
m: Log of nominal stock of money (M3). Approximated as an index 
number with base 1961=100. Transformation of annual growth 
rates (year-end). (Table 50 of SAEE) 
p: Log of deflator of gross domestic product at market prices. 
Approximated as an index number with base 1961=100. 
Transformation of annual growth rates. (Table 24 of SAEE) 
yn: Log of nominal GDP approximated by an index number with base 
1961=100. Transformation of annual growth rates (year-end). 
(Table 7 of SAEE) 
y: Real GDP (yn - pl. 
rs: Nominal short-term interest rate (table 51 of SAEE) 
rl: Nominal long-term interest rate (table 52 of SAEE) 
sp: Interest rate spread (rl - rs) 
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A.1.2 Justification of the methodology 
The methodological approach involved the estimation by non-linear OLS 
using Hendry's methodology. The reason for this approach as opposed to other 
alternatives such as, for example, the estimation of a VAR-ECM model where 
joint consideration is made of all (direct and indirect) transmission channels 
between the money stock and interest rates, is detennined by the very motivation 
of the paper. 
Estimating a single behaviour equation allows for a focus on the 
phenomenon of controllability, placing the emphasis on the estimation of the 
direct channel of transmission from interest rates to the money stock(1). This 
effect is defended in the main text as the main way of evaluating controllability 
by a central bank. In relation to quantitative aspects, this channel is 
characterised by the fact that it is estimated and analysed with greater certainty 
than other indirect channels with potential feedback effects and which, therefore, 
may be estimated with a greater degree of uncertainty. 
A.UI Cointegration test hetween nominal expenditure and the money 
stock 
The close relationship seen in Chart 1 of the main text between nominal 
expenditure and the nominal stock of money, both for Germany and EMUll, 
leads, in an initial stage of the exercise, to a test of cointegration between both 
variables. The procedure used is the error-correction mechanism (ECM), testing 
significance according to the approach of Banerjee et al (1993). 
Table a.l presents the results of the test made for the sample period 
1970-1997. Moreover, the test does not reject the existence of a cointegration 
vector [1 -11, i.e. the existence of unit elasticity of nominal expenditure, both in 
Germany and EMUll, cannot be rejected. 
(l) Other estimates of demand for money for EMU countries can be found for 
example in Monticelli and Strauss-Kahn (1992). Fase (1998) presents a number 
of specifications and estimates of money-demand equations for various 
aggregations of European countries. A vast bibliography on this issue can also be 
found in this book. 
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table a1.1 
Cointegration test of nominal expenditure 
A(m). = c. + a(m - �yn)'-l + yAm._l + 6Ayn. 
Sample period: 1970 1997 (27 observations) 
Estimation: non-linear least squares(l) 
GERMANY EMU-ll 
� 1.07 (21.7) 0.94 (13.04) 
SSR 0.57 0.92 
F 10.5 97 
0·100 1.9 1.1 
DW 1.9 2.3 
ECM(1)'O) 5.2" 5.3-' 
ECM(1)'2) with 4.95-- 4.6--
�=1 
ll) In oracKets: t-stuaent statlstlc. 
(2) ECM: t-ratio test of the coefficient of the error-correction 
mechanism. (Critical value: tables of Banerjee et a\. pg 43). 
-- Ho rejected at 1% significance level (cointegration accepted) . 
• Ho rejected at 5% significance level (cointegration accepted) 
These results allow to estimate the money demand equation in terms of 
velocity of circulation. Thus, the endogenous variable is the inverse of the velocity 
of circulation of money, with the interest rate being the determining argument 
in the long-run equation. 
A.1.4 Specification and estimation of the velocity-of-circulation 
equation 
Specification of the money demand equation for Germany and EMUll is 
as follows: 
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a (m-p-y), = c, • a«m-p-y) - pr)t-1 • l,ay, • 6ar, • psp, 0.1) 
In connection with this specification, the consideration of interest rates in 
the velocity equation is briefly discussed below. 
In the description of equation 1.1, only one interest rate is made explicit. 
Specifically, the alternative rate is considered as the sole argument. The reason 
for obviating any consideration of an own rate" is because of the particular 
features of this rate in each country, depending on the assets making up its 
definition of money. In this respect, in Germany, the incidence these assets may 
have on the demand for money would be very limited as the return on monetary 
assets is very low. However, in EMU11 the own rate mirrors the fact that a 
significant portion of assets yielding a remuneration close to market rates is 
included in the definition of M3. However, the consideration of this effect, with 
its own dynamics, might exert some perverse effect on the estimation. In any 
event, a technical impossibility exists, as there is no statistical information to 
elaborate a synthetic interest rate for the EMU area that would reflect the effect 
of own dynamics in determining the money stock. Finally, a strict definition of 
the own rate should be weighted by the zero-rate remunerated currency stock. In 
the case of Germany, for example, this accounts for a significant percentage of its 
total.monetary assets. 
The aim of the econometric exercise is to establish a specification of the 
long-run relationship in terms of the alternative rate, Table A.2 presents the 
results of the estimations on three approaches: long-term interest rates, short­
tenn rates and, finally, long-tenn rates with the slope of the yield curve (defined 
as long-term minus short-term), 
The results with the long·tenn rate are appreciably better than those with 
the short·tenn rate. In this regard, it should be pointed out that, although in 
determining the degree of controllability the relevant channel is that leading from 
the short-term rate -on which the monetary authority can exert a direct 
influence- to the monetary aggregate, the most appropriate transmission tool in 
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this channel is the long-term rate, which approximates the return on most of the 
non.monetary assets(21. 
Also, the term structure of short-term interest rates determines the level 
of the long-term rate. This implicit relationship implies a functional relationship 
as follows: 
(1.2) 
where r. represents the alternative rate, TI is the long-term rate and T, the short· 
term rate. 
This functional relationship allows the rates structure to be estimated 
independently of the money demand equation, in whose specification only the 
long-term rate would enter as an argument (se� table a1.2Y31 (4). 
Concretely, the most satisfactory specification is that which considers the 
long-term rate as an alternative rate. This specification is the basis for the 
various simulation exercises presented in this paper to evaluate controllability. 
In this respect, it should be pointed out that the long-term semi-elasticity of the 
interest rate in the equation that includes the long-term rate is 5.3 in the case 
of Germany, compared with 0.9 in the case of EMUll. This result highlights the 
differential aspects regarding controllability that EMUll may exert in relation 
to a country such as Germany. 
(21 The ten-year public debt bond would be an approximation to this interest 
rate. 
131 In fact, the combined estimation of the short-term and long-term rate in the 
money demand equation does not entail significant improvements on the results 
compared with the simplest specification considering only the long-term rate. 
Even if the spread (long-term rate minus short-term rate) is considered in the 
dynamics of the equation, the improvement is only marginally significant in the 
case of Germany and not significant in the case of EMUll. 
(4) In annex 2, a term-structure equation is specified and estimated. 
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Annex 2. ''Backward-looking'' and "forward-looking" estimates 
of long-term interest rates 
Under a monetary policy strategy such as that considered in this paper, 
the monetary policy operational tool is the short-term interest rate. However, as 
shown in annex 1, the specification of the money demand equation offering the 
best statistical conditions is that specified in terms of the long-term interest rate. 
4(m - p - Y), = h (r,) (2.1) 
This implies that, in order to analyze the sensitivity of the monetary 
aggregate to a change in the expected path of short-term rates, it is necessary to 
establish a functional relationship between both kinds of interest rate (long-term 
and short-term), r, = f (r,) . Accordingly, the money stock equation can be 
specified in terms of the short-term interest rate: 
4(m - p - Y), = h U(r,») (2.2) 
The aim of this annex is twofold. First, the estimation ofa term-structure 
equation is presented in order to determine, in combination with the money 
demand equation, the degree of response of this variable to changes in short-term 
interest rates. And further, this same equation is used for simulation purposes, 
as an approximation to extrapolating the long-term interest-rate cycle, departing 
from the short-term rates scenario used in the simulation exercise presented in 
the main text. 
Specifically, there are two methodological approaches for the estimation 
of the long-term path of rates in the simulation period considered (1999-2008). 
"Backward-looking" methodology, using equations of the long-term 
interest-rate structure as a function of the short-term one, in terms of an error 
correction mechanism model, both for Germany and for EMU-ll. 
r, = f""" (r,) 
Therefore, the specification of the equation of velocity of circulation as a 
function of short-term rates could be expressed as 
4(m - p - Y), = h U"",.....,(r») (2.3) 
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That allows to examine the response of the monetary aggregate to changes in 
short-term interest rates. Results of the equation linking short- and long-term 
rates are presented in table A.2.1. 
"Forward-looking" methodology. In this case the extrapolation oflong­
term rates is made calculating the geometric average of short-term rates for the 
next n years, according to the following expression: 
(2.4) 
This means that the relationship between short-term and long-term rates 
will vary in terms of time short-term interest rates are expected to remain at a 
certain level. Specifically, for a geometric average often years, a short-term rate 
change of 1 point will translate into an increase in the long-term rate of 1 pp too 
if it is expected to hold for ten years or more; into an increase of, approximately, 
0.5 pp ifit is expected to hold for 5 years; or into a change of 0.1 pp if the change 
in the short-term rate is maintained during 1 year. 
The value r, obtained from the foregoing expression may thus be 
interpreted as the average short-term interest rate which, were it to hold 
constant for n years, would allow us to obtain the final return arrived at with the 
short-term rate sequence: TI, _ '6, , \ '  ... . '.I,," 
(1 +r,)" = ( 1 + r, ) ' (1 + r  ) • . . . • (I +r ) , , s,_\ .I,". 
When calculating rl as a simple geometric average, we are considering 
that, in the estimation of the long-term rate in a certain year, the estimation of 
the short rate for that year and that within 9 years, will have an equal influence 
(same weighting). However, the estimates of the closest short rates are subject 
to less uncertainty and, therefore, should have a bigger weighting than those 
calculated for periods at a more distant horizon. 
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According to this, we could consider the calculation of long- term interest 
rates in terms of "forward-looking" expectations, on the basis of a weighted 
geometric average of the short-term rate for the next 10 years, where the 
weightin�s are inversely proportionate to the distance in years of each of the 
short-term rates in relation to the moment at which the long-term rate is 
estimated (e.g. the short-term rate expected in two years time should be given 
half the weighting than the short-term rate expected for next year): 
p2 
where pI + p2 + . . .  + pIO = 10 
pI ' p3 = 1'i ' p4 = pl . ... pIO . l!!. 
2 ' 3 ' 4 ' 10 
pI + pI + I'i + ... + pI • 10 
2 3 10 
pI (1 + � + 1 + + 
1
�) = 10 
Clearing pJ gives: 
pI • 3,4142; 
p5 • 0.6828 ; 
p9 = 0,3794 ; 
p2 • 1,7071 ; 
p6 = 0,5690 ; 
pIa · 0,3414 
p3 • 1,1381; 
p7 • 0,4877 ; 
p4 
• 0,8535 
p8 • 0,4268 
(2.5) 
Having obtained the path of long-term interest rates departing from the 
short rates scenario r" = lfo"""", (r,) , the response of the monetary aggregate 
can be calculated in terms of the velocity equation (2.1): 
�(m - p - Y), = h Ufo"""",(r,)] (2.6) 
-
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Table A2.2 presents the cyclical scenario of short-term rates considered in 
the document and the long-term paths estimated with the aforementioned 
backward-looking and forward-looking methods. 
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Table a2.1 
INTEREST RATES STRUCTURE 
Estimation method: non·linear least squares(l) 
f1 r� = ct + a(rl - lir ,,),-1 +pf1r" 
Germany EMU-ll 
Sample: 1970-1997 1976-1997 1970-1997 
C 0.022 (2.6) 0.02 (2.4) 0.013 (1.8) 
a -0.6 (-3.8) -0.55 (3.2) -0.53 (-3.4) 
� 0.6 (6.1) 0.5(5.1) 0.81 (7.8) 
P 0.38 (6.8) 0.44 (6.2) 0.53 (7.3) 
R' 0.75 0.77 0.72 
a x 100 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Dw 1.8 1.9 1.4 
F 23.6 19.8 19.7 
SSR 0.00085 0.0006 0.001 
LM(4) 0.73 0.98 1.6 
B-J 1.27 0.51 1.6 
ARCH(4) 0.5 0.45 0.4 
Q(4) 3.93 3.7 3.6 
CH'» 1.6(a) 1.6''' 9.1(a) 
(1) In brackets: t-student statistic. 
(2) CH: Chow stability test, (a) period 1977-1997 
(b) period (85-97) 
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1976-1997 
0.01 (1.4) 
-0.44 (-2.7) 
0.81 (6.4) 
0.7 (7.7) 
0.77 
0.6 
1.8 
20.5 
0.0006 
0.47 
0.35 
2.5 
3.2 
3.7(bJ 
table a2.2 
CYCLICAL SIMULATION OF SHORT·TERM RATES 
AND ESTIMATES OF WNG-TERM RATES 
.- ........... LoDl-tenD mten.t rate. 
_ NO-
CydicaI limulatioD ... --.......- - P-.rd-1ookbIa .... te 
" 
" = f .... (',J " = f_ (',J 
199 3.3% 5.64% 5.12% 
8 
199 4.8% 6.15% 6.00% 
9 
200 6.3% 6.88% 6.69% 
0 
200 7.8% 7.69% 7.11% 
1 
200 9.3% 8.54% 7.20% 
2 
200 8.3% 8.52% 6.66% 
3 
200 7.3% 8.16% 6.15% 
4 
200 6.3% 7.67% 5.70% 
5 
200 5.3% 7.12% 5.33% 
6 
200 4.3% 6.55% 5.09% 
7 
200 3.3% 5.97% 5.12% 
8 
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